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Abstract
To make good decisions, people must be able to identify the ethical features 
of a situation, i.e., to notice when and how the welfare of others and ethical 
values are at stake. In the work of military and law enforcement officers, moral 
sensitivity is of special importance, due to an especially stressful working 
environment and the severe consequences that a blindness to moral features 
may have for diverse parties. As we argue, morally sensitive people overcome 
three blinders that may lead others to ignore moral aspects in their decision 
making: Cognitive overload, psychological biases, and moral disengagement. 
Based on these challenges, we suggest four general learning outcomes for the 
training of moral sensitivity: (1) an empathic concern for relevant groups, (2) 
an awareness for one’s vulnerability to biases and stress, (3) moral schemas 
for the evaluation of risky situations, and (4) a sensitivity to attitudes of moral 
disengagement. To achieve the relevant learning outcomes in the ethics 
training of military and police personnel, we offer indicative training examples 
and references. 
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To make good decisions, we must be able to identify the 
ethical features of a situation: How could our actions 
impact the welfare of others, human relations, etc.? If 
we fail to detect moral aspects, we risk harm to others; 
not out of evil intentions, but out of ignorance. Hence, 
moral sensitivity is commonly viewed as the first step 
of moral decision-making and moral action (e.g., Rest 
1982; Tanner & Christen 2014). 
 Moral sensitivity is obviously an important compe-
tence in general, but it seems to be particularly significant 
for members of the police and military (in the following, 
we will speak, more generally, of “security personnel”). 
Police officers’ societal mission is to act as guardians of 
public values: They have a special duty to reflect on their 
work, on the coherence of their professional values, and 
whether their methods and attitudes promote the public 
values they are supposed to protect (Norberg 2013). 
Looking to the military, national defense is “fraught with 
ethical issues and life and death decisions that must be 
handled quickly and correctly,” (Heyler et al. 2016, p. 790) 
making the morality of soldiers equally important. At 
the same time, the work of security personnel includes 
handling heated, stressful and dangerous situations, often 
in dealing with strangers. Taking notice of ethical features 
and the welfare of others is particularly challenging 
under such circumstances, e.g., when feeling threatened 
personally. However, unethical behaviors of security 
personnel, such as insulting, hitting or kicking people 
who pose no security threat, violating humanitarian law, 
or damaging private property can have serious moral 
and legal ramifications, damage military/police relations 
with local populations, and jeopardize the ability of 
operational forces to realize their public objectives 
(Warner et al. 2011). Due to the negative repercussions 
that a lack of moral sensitivity (moral blindness) can have 
in these contexts, and the need of security personnel to 
account to these aspects appropriately, it becomes an 
imperative to assure their moral sensitivity. 
 How can we promote and assure the development of 
moral sensitivity through training activities? Due to its 
reliance on multiple reflective and automatic cognitive 
processes (e.g., Blum 1991), we understand moral 
sensitivity as a competence (Tanner & Christen, 2014). A 
competence, as a learnable ability to solve a certain type 
of problem autonomously and responsibly (EQF 2008), 
ought to address all relevant features of the problem type. 
Hence, in seeking to identify what defines the required 
competence, we need to first understand the relevant 
challenge or problem: in this case, moral blindness, i.e., 
when people overlook moral aspects partially or entirely 
in their decision making. In the following, we present 
the driving factors of moral blindness. Based on these 
factors, we then propose four priorities for the training 
of moral sensitivity and make proposals how these may 
be addressed in the training of security personnel. 
Overcoming moral blindness: the challenge of 
moral sensitivity
Numerous factors may lead people to overlook moral 
aspects, and thus to ignore them. In Figure 1, we present 
a short synthesis of our findings from a systematic review 
that is work in progress (Katsarov et al. forthcoming). 
In brief, three sets of factors may blind people to 
moral aspects: They may be cognitively overwhelmed, 
psychologically biased, or morally disengaged. This 
presumes that they are generally motivated to be moral, 
a distinct goal of ethics training, which we cannot 
discuss here.
Figure 1: Causes of Moral Blindness
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Blindness due to cognitive overload 
Even three-year-old children notice moral issues when 
they are blatantly obvious, e.g., when a person is hit 
intentionally (Decety et al. 2012). Morally sensitive 
people have been shown to notice ethical issues, 
even when other aspects distract from them – unlike 
insensitive people, who only notice ethical issues, when 
there are no distractors (Fialkov et al. 2014). Two factors 
are likely to cognitively overwhelm people in detecting 
ethical issues: low moral intensity and ego depletion.
Moral intensity: Negative consequences in the future, for 
people who aren’t present, and which are a side-effect 
of one’s action (or inaction) are more difficult to notice 
than immediate consequences for colleagues or family 
members. Jones (1991) introduced the idea of moral 
intensity to help distinguish between obvious moral 
aspects (high intensity) and more subtle aspects (low 
intensity). A colleague’s alcohol problem may qualify as 
an example for low moral intensity (Seiler et al. 2011): 
People may underestimate the risk that their colleague 
could make serious mistakes on duty, thereby potentially 
harming other people, who aren’t clearly identified.
Ego depletion: In and after situations of high stress, e.g., 
time pressure or cognitive strain, people’s capacity for 
self-control is diminished, limiting their ability to behave 
in line with their (moral) aspirations, and reducing their 
ability to recognize ethical features of situations (Gino et 
al. 2011). Warner and colleagues (2011) found that the 
best predictor of U.S. soldiers’ unethical behavior against 
non-combatants in the battlefield was the intensity of 
their exposure to direct combat; stress, which was also 
a strong correlate of depression or post-traumatic stress 
disorder. Stress is also known to affect law enforcement 
personnel strongly (Morgan et al. 2000).
Blindness Due to Psychological Biases
A wide array of psychological biases can be an additional 
source of moral blindness, many of which are discussed 
by Bazerman and Tenbrunsel (2011). They can distract 
even those people who can see through situations 
of low moral intensity and whose cognitive capacity 
isn’t overloaded. Several of these biases are already 
implicitly involved in lowering the moral intensity of 
issues: People tend to discount the future, paying more 
attention to immediate consequences (discounting-
the-future bias), and consequences for people close to 
them (in-group-favoritism), or alike them (similarity-
familiarity-bias). Two other psychological biases may 
be especially hazardous in security contexts: conflicts of 
interest and the status-quo bias. 
Conflicts of interest: When people have a personal 
interest, they are unable to assess situations objectively 
– even when they actively try to be objective and are 
rewarded for their objectivity (Moore et al. 2010). In 
the dangerous work of police and military, the risk of 
distorted perceptions is high, e.g., regarding the risks of 
different strategies (was it really impossible to help?), or 
a colleague’s behavior (was he really being fair?).
Status-quo bias: People tend to favor established be- 
haviors and conditions, even when there are good reasons 
to change them (Samuelson & Zeckhauser 1988). When 
existing practices are immoral, e.g., discriminatory be- 
haviors towards female colleagues, or “teaching a lesson” 
to convicted felons by beating them up, people may feel 
more concerned about the risks of changing their behavior 
(e.g., losing their sense of identity) than about the risk of 
failing to change (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel 2011). 
Blindness Due to Moral Disengagement
Another reason why people may be blind to moral 
aspects, is that they have developed attitudes, which cause 
them to discount any ethical considerations in the first 
place, e.g., when dealing with a certain group of people. 
Following Bandura (1999), we speak of attitudes of moral 
disengagement here. There is some evidence that security 
personnel may be particularly prone to developing such 
attitudes. For instance, Morgan and colleagues (2000, 
213) found that some police officers conveyed “us and 
them” attitudes, cynicism and a lack of trust towards 
citizens, and that some law enforcement trainees thought 
that the justice system should move towards “an eye 
for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.” Two types of moral 
disengagement, which may be particularly relevant in 
operational contexts are rigid framing and dehumanizing.
Rigid framing: Frames are mental structures that people 
develop to make sense of complex reality. Rigid framing 
occurs, when people exclude ethical considerations 
from decision-making and only view it as a matter of 
strategy or tactics, for instance (Palazzo et al., 2012). In 
a military setting, rigid framing could lead soldiers to 
focus on eliminating an enemy so strongly, for instance, 
that they ignore potential harm to noncombatants.
Dehumanizing: Goffman (2014) describes how police 
officers harass the relatives of former convicts to pressure 
them into give away the whereabouts of the people they 
are looking for. It is likely that the relevant police officers 
are so convinced about being “at war” with the entire 
community of the former convicts that they dismiss or 
forget about the people’s rights and ignore the harm they 
are doing to them, or even attribute the blame to them 
(cf. Bandura 1999).
Consequences for moral sensitivity training
Based on these three types of blinders, we propose four 
central goals for the training of moral sensitivity:
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- An empathic concern for relevant groups
- An awareness for one’s vulnerability to biases and stress
- Moral schemas for the evaluation of risky situations
- Sensitivity to attitudes of moral disengagement
In the following, we will shortly introduce these edu- 
cational goals in relation to the three types of blinders 
and share some suggestions on relevant training 
approaches. It is important to note that these different 
strategies may reinforce each other and overlap to 
some extent.
Empathic concern for relevant groups
An active concern for relevant groups, and knowledge 
of their needs and interests makes it easier for people 
to imagine how others could be affected by different 
actions and situations. If people don’t care about the 
welfare of groups to which they don’t belong, and don’t 
understand their way of life, noticing when situations 
and actions could harm them becomes difficult. 
 In-group favoritism and the familiarity-similarity 
bias may be particularly important topics both for the 
military and the police. Security personnel need to 
depend on each other in moments of high stress and 
uncertainty, when their lives are at risk; in the battlefield, 
or when facing an armed criminal. Hence, it’s only 
natural that they develop a strong emotional concern 
for their colleagues and other members of their vocation 
(Cacioppo et al. 2015). This tendency for a strong social 
cohesion can lead members of high-risk occupations 
to isolate themselves socially as a community, a well-
known phenomenon among law enforcement officers 
(Schmalleger 1997). Morgan et al. (2000, 214) suggest 
that this tendency to self-imposed isolation “could 
possibly limit the ability of many of these police officers 
to take a broader perspective and analyse different 
points of view.” Police officers, with whom they worked, 
expressed “us and them” attitudes when speaking 
of civilians, a reluctance to trust “outsiders”, and an 
unwillingness to “burden” friends and family members. 
 Police and soldiers risk being biased in their 
perception of moral issues in several ways due to this 
phenomenon. First, their social isolation may lead them 
to neglect the needs and social realities of diverse groups, 
with which they deal on a regular basis. They may develop 
attitudes towards other groups, which don’t allow them 
to feel an adequate empathic concern for people of these 
groups, e.g., when they are harmed or at risk of being 
harmed. Moreover, they probably experience a tendency 
to discount the perspectives of people from other groups, 
when members of their own in-group are involved in a 
conflict. Building empathic concern for relevant groups 
seems particularly important for these reasons, e.g., for 
civilian non-combatants of nations where the military 
is intervening, or for people from different local social 
groups in the case of police officers. 
There are two key strategies to develop an empathic 
concern for relevant groups – which, of course, need 
to be identified first. First, exposure to these groups can 
change our attitudes significantly. As Bazerman and 
Tenbrunsel (2011, 48) argue: “The less exposure we have 
to people who are different from us, whether in terms 
of race, culture, religion, and so on, the more likely 
we are to view them through a narrow, biased lens.” 
Second, exercises of perspective taking can promote an 
empathic concern for members of the relevant groups 
(Batson et al. 1997). An important point here is to 
imagine how individual members of specific groups 
may have felt about and perceived specific events – not 
how oneself would feel and perceive a situation (Decety 
& Cowell 2014). Members of these groups should be 
portrayed positively, from the perspective of learners. 
This is crucial, because the goal must be to foster 
learners’ identification with members of this group, the 
foundation of people’s ability to empathize with others at 
an affective level, as if they were concerned themselves 
(Mitchell et al. 2006).
Awareness for one’s vulnerability to biases and stress
All professionals should be aware of their vulnerability 
to psychological biases, which may distort their 
perceptions and decision-making – especially 
professionals who need to make rapid decisions under 
high pressure. Bazerman & Tenbrunsel (2011) suggest 
that a couple of intervention strategies are helpful for 
most biases. 
 A general awareness to one’s vulnerability to biases 
and stress and the possible negative consequences of 
misguided actions can facilitate more careful and critical 
attitudes and the development of better impulse control. 
This awareness can then be used in exercises, where 
learners anticipate how they may feel and behave in 
situations that are prone to bias, e.g., pressure through 
a supervisor. The goal of such exercises is to develop 
personal scripts how one would act in such a situation, 
e.g., questions one could ask, or how one could gain time 
to think matters through (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel 2011).
 Interventions for the development of individual 
or social resilience in dealing with stress are probably 
another powerful antidote to this source of moral 
blindness. In the training of medical professionals, 
mindfulness training has led to substantial improve- 
ments of resilience, including lower burnout, less de- 
humanization of patients, and higher levels of empathy 
(Krasner et al. 2009). Emotional intelligence training 
is probably also helpful in terms of learners’ ability to 
notice their own emotional reactions (e.g., to group 
pressure) and be more aware of their physiological 
condition and needs (tiredness, nervousness, etc.) – 
which ought to be perceived as important warning 
signals for an increased vulnerability to biased per- 
ceptions and the effects of ego depletion. 
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Moral schemas for the evaluation of risky situations
When moral intensity is low, i.e., when it isn’t 
immediately clear, how an action may cause harm to 
other people or society at large, people may overlook 
moral issues. For instance, it is important for police to 
understand how corruption can support the growth of 
organized crime and, over time, create a more dangerous 
environment for citizens and the police (negative 
consequences). What matters here, is the accessibility 
of the motivationally relevant moral representations 
(schemas) for an immediate interpretation of certain 
situations, e.g., accepting a favor in exchange for 
ignoring injustice, as morally problematic (cf. Eitam & 
Higgins 2010). If people lack mental representations, 
which help them to interpret morally relevant actions, 
options, or situations intuitively, they will easily fail to 
notice ethical issues of low moral intensity, especially 
when acting under pressure. 
 Security personnel should be trained in developing 
moral schemas for the evaluation of frequent ethical risks 
and problems in their line of work. Seiler et al. (2011) 
demonstrate a powerful approach. They organized one-
week trainings for military officers and soldiers, who 
were trained and assessed in recognizing moral issues 
of realistic military cases and finding solutions to them. 
They varied cases of high moral intensity (lives at stake) 
with cases of low moral intensity (e.g., alcohol problem 
of an officer). Their training combined an intensive 
individual reflection of the cases with an interactional 
approach, where participants first listened to each 
other’s reflections and solutions in small groups and 
were then challenged to come to a consensus. After the 
training, participants of the intervention group identified 
significantly more moral and instrumental components 
to consider in decision making than before – both for 
high- and low-intensity cases, also in the long term. 
 An alternative approach could be for learners to write 
up and share their own, real cases (Norberg 2013). We 
assume that such case-based activities can foster moral 
sensitivity mainly by developing moral schemas, e.g. to 
detect and interpret warning signals for immoral acts 
automatically and associate them with potential harm 
to others. Additionally, case-based learning may also 
help to sensitize people for the dangers of psychological 
biases and attitudes of moral disengagement. 
Sensitivity to attitudes of moral disengagement
Often, people don’t start out with morally disengaged 
attitudes. Rather, they gradually change their attitudes, 
by making one mildly unethical decision at first, which 
they then rationalize and treat as the new norm. For 
instance, people may make unethical decisions due to 
psychological biases, and then convince themselves that 
their decision was correct by blaming the victim (“He 
should have been more careful. I just did my job.”). Step 
by step, they develop attitudes of moral disengagement 
on this kind of a slippery slope (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel 
2011). Attitudes of moral disengagement may therefore 
be understood as systems of evaluative beliefs, which 
people have internalized over time, and which lead 
them to make unethical decisions and defend them. 
 To help people overcome attitudes of moral 
disengagement, they need to understand how specific 
attitudes may affect their moral behavior negatively 
and lead to unethical outcomes. Where people don’t 
care about members of certain groups, it is probably 
necessary to build empathic concern for these groups 
first (see above). When people engage in rigid framing, 
e.g., when they only “weigh the costs” of different 
strategies in monetary value – even when people’s lives 
are at stake – strategies like the development of moral 
schemas (see above) may be helpful. A powerful strategy 
is to show people, how different attitudes, including 
attitudes of moral disengagement, lead to different 
consequences, e.g., using movie vignettes (Warner 
et al. 2011) or through trial-and-error exercises in 
simulations or video games (see Katsarov et al. 2016 and 
2017 for further details). 
 Finally, a critical introspection on one’s own norms, 
their origin and their relation to power may be necessary 
for people to overcome deeply rooted attitudes of moral 
exclusion (Opotow 2011), e.g., whereby women or 
foreigners are generally viewed as inferior, unworthy 
of moral consideration, and legitimate victims of 
oppression. Approaches of anti-oppressive education 
(Kumashiro 2000) may be required here.1
Discussion
We are currently working on a systematic review of 
interventions for the development of moral sensitivity 
(Katsarov et al. forthcoming). Well-conceived inter-
ventions tend to be relatively successful, especially 
when learners are actively involved in the process. 
Differentiated comparisons and combinations of the 
different learning strategies, which we have suggested 
here, have yet to be tested. Also, game-based learning 
interventions, which promise to be fruitful, have hardly 
been tested so far (Katsarov et al. 2017). We hope that 
this framework will help stimulate new interventional 
efforts and rigorous research for their evaluation.
 On a final note, moral sensitivity cannot and should 
not only be stimulated educationally. It also depends on 
the ethical culture of the relevant community: Butterfield 
1 We thank our anonymous reviewer for raising this point. 
119
and colleagues (2000) have found that the use of moral 
language and the existence of a competitive framework 
both influence moral sensitivity. Supporting the im- 
portance of relevant leadership, Warner and colleagues 
(2011, p. 922) concluded that the success of their pro-
gram was probably related to the fact that military 
leaders at each level of the hierarchy trained their own 
subordinates, which probably led to a cultural change of 
enhanced ethical awareness and leadership expectations. 
Seiler and colleagues (2011, 465) suggest that “the 
moral dimension of military decision making has to 
be systematically integrated in tactical and operational 
decision making in military training exercises.” As 
humans, we are always learning and optimizing our 
work – not only in training. Leaders must recognize this 
and ensure that moral sensitivity matters in practice. 
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